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R1EC9NT DCISIONS
thought, would do much to induce local authorities to pay less attention to pressure
groups.3 2 This latter thought coincides with the theory that private organizations
acting in the capacity of censors are within the reach of the fourteenth amendment,
in that they exercise powers similar to the state.8 3 These remedies appear to be
beyond the grasp of the ordinary dealer in books, however.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion of others that this problem is insolvable and no method of
attaining relief is available at this point seems incorrect. However, the suggestions
put forth in this article are only suggestions, the ultimate solutions lie elsewhere-
in the courage of book dealers and other citizens who in the last instance must
demand and defend their rights.
Joseph D. Mintz
Constitutional Law: Fifth Amendment Privilege
Relator was held in contempt of court for refusing to answer, in spite of
immunity granted by the State, questions of a Louisiana Grand Jury investigating
public bribery. An indictment charging violations of a federal statute arising out
of alleged gambling activities was pending against him in a United States District
Court. Reversing the conviction, the Louisiana Supreme Court held (4-3), to
require answers concerning his gambling activities would violate his privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. State v. Dominguez,
228 LA. 284, 82 So. 2d 12 (1955).
Article 1, section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution grants an exemption from
compulsory self-incrimination "except as otherwise provided in this constitu-
tion . . ." The privilege is denied by Article 19, section 13, in bribery investiga-
tions but the compelled testimony "shall not afterwards be used against him in any
judicial proceeding . . ." Immunity is also provided for by statutory provisions
dealing with the subject matter of public bribery. Wyest's Louisiana Revised
Statute&, §§14:121, 15:468.
The questions which relator refused to answer sought to connect him with the
bribery of police officers during his operations of lotteries. Such testimony would
have been very pertinent to the pending federal prosecution which, of course,
could not be prevented by the State-granted immunity.
It is well settled that the fifth amendment is not applicable to the states.
32. LOCKIART & McCLuRE, op. cit. supra, note 5.
33. Note 61 HARv. L. REV. 344 (1948).
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barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 242 (1833). Nor is its exemption from compulsory
self-incrimination incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment so as to apply to
state proceedings. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908). These views
were reaffirmed by a divided Court in Adamson v. California, 322 U. S. 46 (1946).
Furthermore, it has been held that the use in a federal prosecution of testimony
elicited in a state proceeding under state granted immunity does not violate the
Fifth Amendment. Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487 (1943), (but cf.
Clark v. State, 68 Fla. 433, 67 So. 135 (1914), state's use of testimony given in
federal proceeding unconstitutional under Florida Constitution; Adama v. Mary-
land, 347 U. S. 179 (1954), federal immunity statute precluded use of testimony in
state proceeding).
The problem thus created under our separate federal and state sovereignties,
as witnessed by the instant case, is of particular concern in these times of extensive
and possibly conjunctive investigations under federal and state auspices. The tradi-
tional rule states that possible incrimination under the laws of another jurisdiction
does not justify exemption from compulsory self-incrimination. 8 WIGMoRE,
EVIDENCE §2258 (3rd ed. 1940). This view is generally based on an assumption
that the danger of prosecution in another jurisdiction is remote. When the danger
could be said to be imminent, some courts have allowed the privilege. See 58
Am. JuR., Witnesses §51 (1948).
The federal rule states that possible incrimination under state law is not
sufficient reason for invoking the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Mnrdock,
284 U. S. 141 (1931). [But see United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597
(N. D. Ohio 1952); United States v. Marcello, 196 F. 2d 437, 442-443 (5th Cir.
1952) (dictum).) As to incrimination under federal law, state courts have differed
in their views. In a leading case the denial of a privilege in a state proceeding
under a state immunity statute was held to be constitutional under the state and
Federal Constitutions, even though federal violations would be revealed by the
required testimony. State v. Jack, 69 Kan. 387, 76 Pac. 911 (1904), aff'd sub nom
Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372 (1905). New York courts have followed this
majority rule and hold that immunity from state prosecution is all that is required
to justify a denial of the state constitution's privilege against self incrimination,
possible federal incrimination notwithstanding. Dunham v. Ottinger, 243 N. Y.
423, 438, 154 N. E. 298, 302 (1926); Application of Herlands, 204 Misc. 373
124 N. Y. S. 2d 402 (Sup. Ct. 1953). See also Cabot v. Corcoran, - Mass. -,
123 N. E. 2d 221, 224 (1954) (decided on other grounds); State v. Arnold, Ohio
C. P. 124 N. E. 2d 473 (1954) (privilege denied in state investigation of
un-American activities). A minority of state courts, including the Louisiana
Supreme Court, have sustained a claim of privilege where the evidence sough;
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would incriminate the witness in another jurisdiction, either state or federal.
People v. Den Vyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N. W. 2d 284 (1947); State ex rel Doran v.
Doran, 215 La. 151, 39 So. 2d 894 (1949); State ex rel Mitchell v. Kelly, - Fla.
- , 71 So. 2d 887, 896-97 (1954); 82 A. L. R. 1380, 1383 (1933).
These cases were cited by the majority in the instant case as authority for its
decision. Particularly relied on was the Den Vyl case, in which a witness was
allowed a privilege against self incrimination in a state proceeding on the grounds
that his testimony would incriminate him in a federal prosecution then pending
against him. But as was pointed out by the dissents in the instant case, the
privilege allowed in the Den Vyl case was that provided by the Michigan Consti-
tution. Similarly in the other cases relied on by the majority, the privilege allowed
in each case was the constitutional privilege of the state which was conducting the
proceedings. It was never the privilege of the other jurisdiction whose prosecution
was feared. These courts have reached their desired results by construing the
state's own exemption from compulsory self incrimination to be still in force and
its application required because the imminent foreign prosecution made the
state's immunity provisions insufficient as a replacement for the ptivilege. Such
reasoning was impossible, however, in the instant case because, as admitted by the
majority, the Louisiana privilege as conditionally granted by Article 1, section 11
of the constitution, was non-existent under Article 19, section 13 in cases of
bribery investigations.
The majority opinion was perhaps motivated by a sense of fairness and
justice which would seem to be lacking in a correct result under these unique
facts, but which can not properly be avoided under present law. The only solution
to this problem of dual sovereignty would seem to lie in an overruling of the
Twining or Feldman decisions, or more probably in federal legislation granting
comity to state immunity laws.
Edward H. Coughlin
Labor Law: Constitutionality of Section 301 (a) of Taft-Hartley Act
In an action by a union for construction of a collective bargaining agreement
and enforcement of individual employees' alleged rights to unpaid wages under
the agreement, held: the action was not within the federal court's jurisdiction as
conferred by the L.M.R.A. provision that suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a union representing employees may be brought in federal
courts without respect to amount in controversy or citizenship of parties, since
the rights sought to be enforced were uniquely personal in nature. Ass'n. of West-
inghouse S. Emp. v. Westinghouse E. Corp., 348 U. S. 437 (1955).
